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ANTITRUST: LIMITATION ON THE GROUP BOYCOTT
PER SE RULE
IN 1959 the Supreme Court unequivocally stated1 that group boycotts
are per se violations of the Sherman Act.2 However, a recent federal
district court decision, United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland,8
refused to follow the broad prohibition of the Supreme Court and
limited the per se rule to group boycotts exerting coercive economic
pressure. In this case, the Government brought an action under Sec-
tions i and 2 of the Sherman Act4 to enjoin the operation of the "mutual
rule" of the Insurance Board, a local organization consisting of inde-
pendent insurance agents." Under this rule, the association denied
membership to agents who did not deal exclusively with capital stock
insurance companies and required resignation of any member who did
not continue to sell only policies issued by stock insurance companies.0
'Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (.959).
'A group boycott is an agreement by two or more persons not to do business with
other individuals or to do business with them only on discriminatory terms. HANDLER,
CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 946-48 (1937). But the common reference to all con-
certed refusals to deal as "boycotts" is objectionable, since the unlawful connotations
accompanying the term actually suggest the result before a determination on the merits
of the validity of the refusal to deal.
* 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 196o).
* 26 Stat. 209 (189o), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1955).
'The Board was organized and incorporated under the laws of Ohio in 1846. The
present articles of incorporation reaffirm the board's historic purpose to foster and pre-
serve the stock ownership principle and the American agency system. In addition, the
Board enters into various activities to promote and elevate the professional standards of
its members and insurance agents in general. United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F.
Supp. 949, 951 (N.D. Ohio 196o).
'The basic distinction between mutual insurance companies and stock insurance
companies lies in the fact that a stock company has for its basis capital stock owned by
the stockholders who own the corporation and are distinct from its policyholders,
whereas a mutual company has no stockholders but only policyholders who are members
of the company. Thus, in the stock companies profits are distributed to the stockholders
in the form of dividends, but in the mutual companies the policyholder receives the
profits by way of a "dividend" or premium allowance. However, if the mutual com-
pany fails, the policyholders might be subject to contingent liability as owners of the
business, while policyholders of stock companies are not subject to such a risk. See, e.g.,
Moreland v. Knox, z68 S.W.zd 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). See VANCE, INSURANCE
314-17 (1930).
There are three classes of insurance agencies: stock agencies, mutual agencies, and
mixed agencies (selling both mutual and stock insurance). In Cuyahoga County, where
the Insurance Board operates, there are 3,288 insurance agents, of which 775 were
members of the Board, 263 are direct employees of mutual companies, and 2,z5o are
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The Government contended that the "mutual rule" was per se unlawful
under Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,7 because it operated
as an agreement to boycott which tended to exclude mutual companies
from representation by independent agents that were members of the
board. The defendant argued, inter alia, that the per se approach was
inapplicable in the present case, because the "mutual rule" operated in
a noncoercive manner. Although holding that the "mutual rule" was
a group boycott, the court rejected the per se approach in favor of the
defendant's contention that the absence of any showing of coercion
required application of the rule of reason. After investigation under the
rule of reason, the Court found that the effect of this concerted refusal
to sell mutual insurance was to exclude mutual companies from repre-
sentation by members of the association and that, therefore, the "mutual
rule" constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.8
Early Supreme Court decisions tended to interpret literally the
Sherman Act's prohibition of every contract, combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade.' The obvious undesirability of such an approach
stock or mixed agencies who are not members of the Board. In Ohio and throughout
the country most independent agents sell both types of insurance. Members of the
Board gain no financial advantage by dealing exclusively with stock companies, but it is
their belief that stock insurance provides a more profitable form of compensation for the
agents. United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949, 954 (N.D. Ohio 796o).
7 359 U.S. 207 (.959).
a When suit was originally brought against the Insurance Board, there were six
rules of the association that were alleged to be violations of the Sherman Act. Three
of the rules were eliminated by a reorganization of the Board in 1953. Upon motions
for summary judgment by both parties, the court held a fourth rule to be an unreason-
able restraint of trade, but refused a final determination on the two remaining board
rules until trial. United States v. Insurance Bd., i4,. F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956)
(proceedings on motion for summary judgment). The Government indicated it no
longer desired to press its claim as to one of the rules, leaving for determination at trial
the sole question whether the "mutual rule" constituted a violation of the Sherman Act.
See generally, Note, io5 U. PA. L. REv. 977 (-957).
" Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal . . . 2" 26 Stat. 209 (789o), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § x (1955).
Justice Peckham, who wrote the opinion in five of the first six Sherman Act deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 21i
(7899) Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898)5 Hopkins v. United States,
-7 U.S. 578 (1898); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898);
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 29o (1897), was the literalist
on the Court. To him, the Sherman Act meant exactly what it said--"every" was
all-inclusive; all restraints were prohibited. Once a restraint of trade was found, the
conduct bringing about this restraint was absolutely prohibited. See HANDLER, ANTI-
TRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 4-7 (1957).
The Supreme Court went so far as to suggest that a covenant not to compete by a
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soon led to the adoption of the "rule of reason," prohibiting only un-
reasonable restraints of trade.'0 However, certain business practices
were considered so inimical to competition that they were conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable, regardless of any compelling business
reasons offered in defense of such practices."
Prior to the establishment of this per se doctrine, some group boy-
cotts had been held to be reasonable restraints of trade.' 2  Application
seller of a business might be condemned under the Sherman Act. United States v. Trans-
Missouri Fright Ass'n, supra at 329 (dictum).
" To determine reasonableness, courts consider the conditions leading to the adoption
of the restraint, the effect of the restraint on competition, and the intent of the partici-
pants. Or, as explained by the Supreme Court in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495, 5z7 (1948) : "In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint...
we look . . . to the percentage of business controlled, the strength of the remaining
competition, whether the action springs from business requirements or a purpose to
monopolize, the probable development of the industry, consumer demands, and other
characteristics of the market."
While the rule of reason was definitely established in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, zzi U.S. I (i91i), such an approach was advocated soon after the adoption of
the Sherman Act in 189o. See Justice White's dissent in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight As'n, 166 U.S. 290, 343 (1897). For a recent indication that the
rule of reason remains the touchstone of the antitrust laws, see United States v. E. I.
DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (.956).
" Even in the decision that established the rule of reason, the Supreme Court inti-
mated that certain conduct was per se unlawful. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
z2 U.S. 1, 58, 65 (1911). However, the per se doctrine was not clearly enunciated
by the Supreme Court until United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)
(price fixing). But the per se doctrine has been expanded by the Court so as to include
other conduct. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying
agreement of patents) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. i (x958) ("prefer-
ential routing" tying agreement).
There are certain definite advantages in the per se approach. It provides a degree
of certainty unobtainable under the rule of reason. Such certainty is desirable from the
standpoint of both industry and the government. The per se rule also diminishes the
time and expense involved in judicial proceedings, since it alleviates the necessity of
extensive economic investigation. However, there are certain disadvantages in this
blanket approach. While the rule of reason provides little certainty, it does provide
flexibility. Such flexibility is desirable when conduct is not blatantly unreasonable,
the rule of reason provides the restraining party with an opportunity to justify his con-
duct, while under the per se rule no such consideration is permitted.
For further discussion contrasting the per se doctrine with the rule of reason, see
Oppenheim, Federal t.titrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrtust
Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1139, x148-56 (1952).
2
.4ccord, Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, z46 U.S. 231 (1918) ; Anderson
v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898) i Hopkins v. United States, 17, U.S. 578 (1898).
In Chicago Bd. of Trade, supra, the Supreme Court found that a regulation of the
Board prohibiting members from purchasing at the end of the business day at a price
other than the dosing bid actually promoted good business and did not adversely affect
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of the rule of reason enabled the Supreme Court to uphold those boy-
cotts that promoted good business practices. After the Court decided
that certain conduct was conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, it
became difficult to ascertain from the opinions relating to concerted
refusals to deal whether a per se rule or the rule of reason had been
applied by the Court,13 but the frequent prohibitions of such conduct
suggested that all such practices were per se unlawful. 4  Moreover,
sweeping dicta by the Supreme Court strengthened the view that all
group boycotts were within the per se category.' 5 Whatever uncer-
tainty remained was apparently resolved by the Klor's0 decision. In
anyone. The Court therefore held that this rule was a reasonable restraint on trade not
within the Sherman Act prohibition.
However, under the rule of reason many group boycotts were held to be an un-
reasonable restraint of trade. See, e.g., Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291
(9±3) i Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 4.33 (91o) 5 Loewe v. Lawlor,
2o8 U.S. 274 (19o8) 5 Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
"See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 3z6 U.S. 1 (1945), Fashion Origi-
nator's Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). In Fashion Originator's the Supreme
Court held that it was not error for the district court to refuse to hear evidence of the
reasonableness of the boycott, thus indicating approval of a per se prohibition. But the
Court proceeded to investigate the boycott's effect on the market in order to be certain
that there could be no justification of such conduct.
"' See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Originator's
Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (194.1)5 United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc.,
±8 U.S. 44 (1930); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30
(1930) ; Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 6oo (1914); United
States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 355
U.S. 2Z (1957). However, the Supreme Court in a few instances did indicate that
certain boycotts were not unreasonable restraints on trade. United States v. Oregon
State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (i95z); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933).
"Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 6z5 (1953) (dic-
tum) ; United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (x948) (dictum). A
few lower courts have expressly relied on these dicta. See, e.g., United States v. New
Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 9x5 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 27 (1957),
United States v. Minneapolis Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 99 F. Supp. 75 (D. Minn. 1951).
lo 359 U.S. 207 (957). See 57 MICH. L. REv. 1244 (1959) and 44 MINN. L.
REV. 568 (1959).
Commentators have generally agreed that Klor's definitely resolved the controversy
as to the status of group boycotts under the antitrust laws. According to Handler,
.4nnual Review of Recent Antitrust Developments, 14 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 318, 344-
(1959): "[I1n its unanimous decision in Klor's, the Supreme Court rather bluntly and
emphatically informs the lower courts that when in the past it proclaimed the per se
unlawfulness of group boycotts, it meant precisely what it said. The prohibition is
absolute. There are to be no exceptions, however extenuating may be the conditions
generating the boycott." Oppenheim also interprets Klors as an omnibus condemna-
tion: "The Court [in Klor's] appears to have outlawed group boycotts absolutely.
While it was previously arguable that the Court had preserved a limited area for rea-
Vol. 1961: 6o6]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
that case, Broadway-Hale, a large department store chain, used its eco-
nomic position to "influence" manufacturers and distributors of appli-
ances not to sell their products to a competitor. While group boycotts
designed solely to eliminate competition had been previously condemned
by application of the per se doctrine,1 the Supreme Court in Klor's went
beyond this precedent and indicated that all group boycotts or concerted
refusals to deal are per se illegal.' 8
Many self-imposed refusals to deal by an association such as the
Insurance Board have neither an element of direct coercion on third
parties nor a purpose to suppress competition."0 The existence of such
self-restricting limitations prompted leading authorities writing prior to
Klor's to advocate exclusion of these group boycotts from the per se
censure."0 However, the Supreme Court did not exempt self-restricting,
sonable collective refusals to deal in exceptional instances, Klor's has reduced this pros-
pect to a mirage." Oppenheim, Selected Antitrust Developments in the Courts and FTC
During Past Year, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 37, 55 (959).
However, one commentator feels that the holding in Klor's was equivocal: "What
the Court actually did [in Klor's] was to avoid coming to grips with the dilemma. As
a consequence it is very dificult now to know what the rule on boycotts is." Rahl,
Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's Case,
45 VA. L. REv. 1165, 1170 (i95).
17 E.g., Fashion Originator's Guild, Inc., v. FTC, 312 U.s. 457 (194x); Eastern
States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 6oo (1914).
18359 U.S. 207, 212 (.959).
"For example, regulations adopted by the members of a harness racing association
to promote competition and to standardize the activities of that sport enable the associa-
tion to attain its lawful purposes; yet such regulations could technically be defined as
concerted refusals to deal with nonmembers. See United States v. United States Trotting
Ass'n, TRADE REG. REP. (196o Trade Cases) 1 69,761 (S.D. Ohio 196o) (summary
judgment), where the Government was unsuccessful in its attempt to enjoin under the
Sherman Act such regulations of harness racing.
"0 Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
847 (i955)i Barber, Refusals to Deal, 3 PRA C. LAw. 21 (1957); Handler, Annual
Review of Recent Antitrust Developments, 12 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 4I1, 428-32
(957)0  Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act,
1o GEo. WASH. L. REv. 302 (942) ; Oppenheim, supra, note xx at 1171-75, See also
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 765 (1939).
Furthermore, some lower federal courts have rejected an omnibus per se condemna-
tion of all group boycotts. See Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 24x F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1957); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286, 299-301
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd 725 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955)5 Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v
British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 86 ( 7th Cir. 195z). Contra, United States
v. Minneapolis Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 99 F. Supp. 75 (D. Minn. 1951).
The Second Circuit in the Union Circulation case, supra, stated: "When the courts
.. . are confronted with an alleged boycott whose deleterious effect on competition is
not as apparent on its face as that of the agreements which have been held illegal per se,
they may consider its actual or potential impact upon the competitive fabric of the
particular industry affected2 24 F.2d at 656.
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noncoercive refusals to deal from the per se rule, and commentators
have generally remained dissatisfied with such a comprehensive per se
application to all group boycotts.2 '
In the instant case, although an agent dealing with mutual companies
could not remain a member of the Insurance Board, there was no evi-
dence that the Board exerted any pressure to prevent members from
resigning in order to represent mutual companies.22 Furthermore, there
was no evidence that the mutual companies had been seriously affected
by operation of the "mutual rule." The only adverse effect shown was
an inability of mutual companies in several instances to induce members
to resign from the board in order to represent them.2" On the other
hand, there was evidence that members did not suffer any economic loss
by resignation, but in many respects improved their competitive position,
since after resignation they could retain their agency agreements with
stock companies and acquire similar arrangements with mutual com-
panies. Thus, the instant case presented the type of refusal to deal that
had led many authorities to reject a blanket per se rule for group boy-
cotts. Following the approach recommended by these commentators,
the district court limited the broad per se condemnation of group boy-
cotts in Klor's to the facts in that case. Finding no similar instance of
"coercive economic pressure" in the present case, the court applied the
rule of reason to determine whether the "mutual rule" constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
The instant case indicates the inadvisability of universal condemna-
tion of group boycotts, as stated in Klor's.24 Such a mechanistic approach
21 See Oppenheim, supra note 6 5 RahI, supra note x6. It is difficult to determine
whether Handler approves or disapproves of the broad condemnation of Klor's. Handler,
supra note x6, at 347.
Another district court has also refused to follow the Supreme Court's mandate in
Klor's. United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, TRADE REG. REP. (i96o Trade
Cases) 1 69,761 (S.D. Ohio 296o).
" The evidence tended to show that board agents could accept representation of
mutual companies on a trial basis and still retain membership on the board pending a
final determination whether to accept mutual representation permanently. After such a
trial, some agents relinquished their membership in order to represent mutual companies,
while others decided not to represent mutual companies and retained their membership
in the board. United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949, 953 (N.D. Ohio 196o).
2 However, there was evidence of members of the Board resigning in order to
represent mutual companies. In addition, field agents of mutual companies seeking new
agencies also met with rejections from non-board members. Nor did it appear that
the number of rejections received from the board members was proportionately greater
than rejections from non-board agents. United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp.
949, 953 (N.D. Ohio 296o).
"' Just as a comprehensive per se rule has been recognized as undesirable as to all
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would inhibit some socially and economically desirable business activi-
ties.25  In addition, the general per se prohibition proposed by the
Government in the present case would infringe on the right of business-
men to adopt reasonable restrictions for the lawful purpose of promoting
their economic well-being. Such restrictions, as long. as they do not
materially affect nonmembers, should not be invalidated under the anti-
trust laws. 26 However, from this approach, the holding in the present
case that the "mutual rule" constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade is questionable, since this provision enabled the Insurance Board
to further its legitimate business aspirations with only a slight effect on
those outside the association.27
By the adoption of a "coercion" test, the present case apparently
contradicts the absolute prohibitions of group boycotts laid down by the
Supreme Court in Klor's.28 While the "coercion" test has often been
advocated by commentators,29 this solution is not entirely satisfactory;
tying agreements, it seems that an all-inclusive rule for group boycotts is equally inad-
visable. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (limited per se
rule applied to tying agreement). For a comparison of the per se-group boycott ap-
proach with the more limited per se-tying agreement rule, see Rahl, supra note zi, at
1173.
See generally Oppenheim, supra note ii, at I1171-75.
26 The Supreme Court in Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 6oo,
6o9-io (i9x4.), states: "[I]n its proper construction the [Sherman] act was not in-
tended to reach normal and usual contracts incident to lawful purposes and intended to
further legitimate trade .... "
27 Moreover, the Board renders valuable services to the community, such as offering
educational courses in insurance. The Board also assists the State Superintendent of
Insurance in his enforcement of insurance regulations, and advocates and opposes various
legislation affecting insurance business. United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp.
949, 951 (N.D. Ohio x96o).
28 See note 16 supra. In many respects Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United
States, 234. U.S. 6oo (i914), is similar to the instant case. In that case an association
of retail lumber dealers sent to its members a "blacklist" of those wholesale dealers that
had sold directly to consumers. The Supreme Court found that the obvious implications
of such a list constitute a concerted refusal to deal with the listed wholesalers, and in
language indicative of a per se approach the Court enjoined the sending of such a list
to members of the association. Although blacklisting by itself may be no more "coer-
cive" than the operation of the "mutual rule", other factors in that case seem to justify
the per se approach and distinguish the case from the Insurance Bd. decision. In Eastern
Lumber the association boycotted competitors for the sole purpose of suppressing that
competition. The boycott in the instant case was not of competitors, nor was there any
showing that the Board's motive in applying the "mutual rule" was to suppress com-
petition.
" See, e.g., A7r " GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 132 (1955); Barber, supra
note 2o, at 875-79; Barber, Refusals to Deal, 3 PiRAc. LAW. z (1957); Kirkpatrick,
supra note 2o Oppenheim, supra note xi, at 1171-75; Rahl, supra note 16.
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coercion may appear in many different forms and is not always readily
ascertainable. 0 Nevertheless, by differentiating those group boycotts
that should be dealt with summarily from those that should be further
analyzed in the context of their operation, the "coercion" approach pro-
vides a degree of flexibility unobtainable under strict per se doctrine.
"0 While the coercive element in Klor's was blatant, in many situations it would not
be so obvious. See, e.g., Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins.
Co., 195 F.2d 86 ( 7 th Cir. 1952) (bad risk insurance list sent to insurance companies
throughout the country). Thus, the "coercion" test will require in many instances
investigation into the nature of the industry in order to uncover any possible coercive
factors, and such investigation defeats in part the utility of the per se treatment. But
most commentators have accepted the "coercion" test as a workable and preferable
alternative to an all-inclusive per se rule. See authorities cited in note 29 supra. How-
ever, Handler has been outspoken against the adoption of a "coercion" test: "The only
thing that seems reasonably clear to me is that it is not particularly fruitful to analyze
the problem in terms of whether the boycott has a coercive effect on third parties out-
side the group. A group boycott by its very nature involves coercion and inescapably
has an impact on the outsiders against whom it is directed. Such an approach introduces
no real flexibility into the standards of legality governing joint refusals to deal."
Handler, Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developments, 12 REcoR op N.Y.C.B.A.
411, 431-32 0t957).
